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Abstract
Attempts to recover art forcibly taken by the Nazis have seen
only limited success in United States courts. The 2008 case of
Vineberg v. Bissonnette was a rare victory at that time for the heirs
of Jews seeking recovery of artwork expropriated during the period
of National Socialist rule in Germany. The decision, however, has
been criticized for resting on a shaky legal foundation, due in large
part to poor defense counsel. Further clouding this area of the law,
a German court judgment in 2016, as well as German commentators
have criticized the Bissonnette decision. This Article examines
Vineberg v. Bissonnette, introduces the reader to the 2016 case in
Cologne, and explains the contradictions between the two.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The following Article examines two fairly recent conflicting
court decisions dealing with artwork that was forcibly sold during
the Third Reich – one from the United States and one from
Germany. While commentary on Vineberg v. Bissonnette1 has been
published in the United States,2 little has been published in United
States publications attempting to understand the rationale of a
judgment the High Regional Court of Cologne, Germany, (“Cologne
High Regional Court”) handed down in 2016 that conflicts with the
Bissonnette decision.3 In the Cologne case, Richard Feigen, a
prominent New York art dealer, brought suit against the Lempertz
Auction House (“Lempertz”) in Cologne after he felt compelled to
relinquish possession of a painting he had bought from Lempertz.4

*Temple University (BA with honors); Duquesne University School of Law
(JD with honors); Doctoral candidate at the Chair for U.S. Law, University of
Cologne. Former visiting scholar at Brooklyn Law School. Admitted to practice
law in New York and Connecticut, as well as before the United States Tax
Court. The author would like to thank Dr. Larry Solan and the Brooklyn Law
School for offering their support and resources in the preparation of this article.
1. Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300 (D.R.I. 2007), aff’d, 548 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2008).
2. E.g., Donald S. Burris, From Tragedy to Triumph in the Pursuit of Looted
Art: Altmann, Benningson, Portrait of Wally, von Saher and Their Progeny, 15
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 394, 411-12 (2016); David S. Gold, Is There
Any Way Home? A History and Analysis of the Legal Issues Surrounding the
Repatriation of Artwork Displaced During the Holocaust, 21 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N
ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 12, 17-21 (2010); Jessica Grimes, Forgotten Prisoners
of War: Returning Nazi-Looted Art by Relaxing the National Stolen Property Act,
15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV 521, 527-31 (2010).
3. Oberlandesgericht Köln [OLG Köln] [High Regional Court of Cologne],
July 8, 2016 (Ger.), www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/koeln/j2016/1_U_36_13_Ur
teil_20160708.html. For discussion of the Cologne case in a European
publication, see MATTHIAS WELLER, RETHINKING EU CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW
90-92 (Nomos 2018).
4. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3.

2021]

Recovering Art Looted by the Nazis

549

After Feigen purchased the painting, it was revealed that the piece
had once belonged to Dr. Max Stern, a prominent Jewish art dealer
in Dusseldorf.5 In 1937, the Nazis forced Dr. Stern to close his
gallery and sell the works in it.6
This Article begins by examining the Bissonnette decision, its
fidelity to the state of the law in the United States at that time, and
the effectiveness of Ms. Bissonnette’s defense counsel in pursuing
proper defenses. It ends with a discussion of criticism of the decision
by the Cologne High Regional Court and German publications. An
examination of this criticism and an analysis of Bissonnette is
important for the purpose of uncovering the differences between the
American and German understanding perspectives on this area of
the law. As stated above, many in Germany – most importantly the
courts – question the grounds upon which the Bissonnette decision
rests.
These fundamental differences of perspective between the
United States and Germany do not bode well for American buyers
of artwork who may ask the right questions about it when
considering a purchase, only to discover that the provenance of a
piece is not clean at all. A mistaken or otherwise misinformed buyer
may then have to confront an uncomfortable predicament. If the
buyer relinquishes the work or is otherwise compelled to turn it over
and then subsequently seeks damages from a seller in Europe, the
buyer may find recovery of damages elusive because European
courts will likely have a different understanding of the underlying
facts and applicable law. This was in fact the case when Richard
Feigen brought suit against Lempertz to recover the purchase price
of a piece he relinquished to the Estate of Dr. Max Stern. He alleged
the auction house misrepresented the provenance of a piece he
purchased from it only to have his case dismissed. Of course,
professional buyers of artwork cannot all credibly say they had no
idea there might be a problem with a particular piece. One critical
lesson from these cases is that any work of art that was sold at
auction in the late 1930s should be viewed with extreme care.
Section A of this Article analyzes Vineberg v. Bissonnette, a
case in which the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island awarded recovery to the estate of a Jewish art dealer
who was forced by the National Socialist government in Germany
to liquidate his gallery’s inventory to Lempertz, an auction house in
Cologne, Germany, in 1937. Section B offers an independent
analysis of the Bissonnette judgment. Commentators in both the
United States and Germany have been critical of the court’s opinion
in the case and that criticism provides the impetus for testing the
court’s rationale in this section. Finally, Section C explores the
criticism leveled at the Bissonnette decision by various sources in

5. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
6. Id.
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Germany, most notably the above-referenced judgment a Cologne
appellate court issued in 2016. Section C also looks at the opinions
of commentators in Germany who either generally agree with the
German judgment or offer additional arguments as to why
Bissonnette should be viewed with caution. Section D contains a
brief analysis of German criticism and conclusion.

II. VINEBERG V. BISSONNETTE
A. Introduction
Attempts to recover artwork looted by the Nazis in the 1930s
and 1940s have seen only limited success in United States courts.7
Those who seek recovery of artwork are typically the heirs of Jews
who the National Socialist government of Adolf Hitler forced to
alienate or otherwise relinquish their most valuable property.
Those seeking recovery have had to overcome several difficult
hurdles: they have had to find the property and establish their
superior title to it; they have had to prevail against defenses based
on statutes of limitations; and, they often have had to refute
allegations that they were not diligent in searching for the art.
Opposing parties who allege lack of diligence claim such delay
unfairly prejudices them. What’s more, those seeking recovery have
needed to understand and navigate conflict-of-laws rules that
United States courts inconsistently apply and that can often be
outcome determinative. Congress and several state legislatures
have taken steps to try to alleviate these burdens for those affected
by the Holocaust. Those efforts include Congressional creation in
2016 of a statute of limitations under which “a civil claim or cause
of action against a defendant to recover any artwork that was lost
during [the period between 1933 and 1945] because of Nazi
persecution may be commenced not later than 6 years after the
actual discovery by the claimant.”8 The Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act (“HEAR Act”) effectively codified the principles set
forth in the Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art. The
principles were agreed at a 1998 conference hosted by the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum aimed at easing the procedural
burdens associated with recovering looted art from the Nazi era.9
Notwithstanding these measures, the path to restitution for the
heirs of those victimized by the Nazis is still replete with obstacles.
7. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record:
Nazi-Looted Art Litigation, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 75 (2012).
8. Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 195 (2d.
Cir. 2019) (citing the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526-28).
9. Bret Demarsin, Let’s Not Talk About Terezin: Restitution of Nazi Era
Looted Art and the Tenuousness of Public International Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 137 (2011).

2021]

Recovering Art Looted by the Nazis

551

Recently, a unanimous panel in Zuckerberg v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art held that the HEAR Act does not preclude
defendants from asserting the equitable doctrine of laches in the
types of cases subject to the 2016 Congressional legislation. 10 In so
doing, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (“Second Circuit”) upheld the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York’s (“Southern District of New
York’s”) dismissal of a claim brought by the heir of German Jews
against the Metropolitan Museum of Art that sought damages in
conversion and replevin of a painting.11 As will be discussed below,
overcoming a laches defense, in particular persuading a court that
the delay in bringing the claim was not prejudicial to the defendant,
can be difficult when pursuing a claim to recover property that was
wrongfully taken over a half a century ago.
There have indeed been successful restitution claims. The 2015
motion picture “Woman in Gold” told the story of Maria Altmann, a
refugee Jew, who successfully pursued a claim to Klimt’s “Adele
Bloch-Bauer I,” among other works.12 The Supreme Court of the
United States ruled in 2004 that Altmann could sue the Austrian
government, but the matter was ultimately settled in her favor in
binding arbitration, not in a court of ordinary jurisdiction.13 More
recently in 2019, a New York appeals court upheld a lower court’s
order to return two paintings to the estate of a Jewish artist.14 But
while a modest number of other settlements have been entered into
in the United States in favor of those who have sought restitution
of works of art forcibly taken by the Nazis, the majority of cases
brought by the heirs of Jews have been dismissed by courts, largely
on the bases of defenses in law and equity, such as statutes of
limitations and laches.15 Moreover, museums and other public
institutions have often been successful in preemptively asserting
their own ownership claims in particular pieces of art.16
The 2008 case of Vineberg v. Bissonnette17 was thought to
10. Zuckerberg, 928 F.3d at 197.
11. Id.
12. See Woman in Gold, IMDB (June 27, 2020), www.imdb.com/title
/tt2404425/ (providing synopsis and background on the movie).
13. Patricia Cohen, The Story Behind ‘Woman in Gold’: Nazi Art Thieves and
One Painting’s Return, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015). www.nytimes.com/201
5/03/31/arts/design/the-story-behind-woman-in-gold-nazi-art-thieves-and-onepaintings-return.html; Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
14. Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
15. Emily A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing
Nazi-Looted Art, 51 BOSTON C. L. REV. 473 489 (2010).
16. See e.g. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08-10097RWZ, 2009 WL 6506658 (D. Mass. June 12, 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2010) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Museum of Fine Arts on the
basis of the applicable statute of limitations); Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin,
477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (ruling that the statute of limitations
barred recovery by the heirs).
17. See supra note 1.
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represent somewhat of a breakthrough, however, for those seeking
recovery of Nazi-looted art in a United States federal court. Until
recently, it was the only final judgment upheld on appeal in the
United States that ordered restitution to a plaintiff for artwork
expropriated in Nazi Germany.18 Bissonnette19 is not without its
critics, however, and the criticism is not insignificant. Defense
counsel in Bissonnette failed to properly plead many of its defenses
and failed to raise triable issues of fact to the court.20 This has
prompted many to ask what the outcome might have been had
defense counsel prepared a better defense, including a respected
litigator in the field who has warned that citing Bissonnette as a
precedent should be done with caution.21 Furthermore,
commentators in Germany have questioned both the factual and
legal bases for the court’s ruling, and in 2016 the Cologne High
Regional Court issued a judgment that goes to great lengths to
contradict many of the factual premises underlying Bissonnette.22
That High Regional Court judgment will be discussed in depth in
Section C.

B. Background and Procedural History
In May of 2006, the Estate of Dr. Max Stern (“Estate”) filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island (“District of Rhode Island”) seeking, inter alia,
recovery of an oil painting on canvas entitled “Girl from the Sabine
Mountains.”23 The Estate had discovered the painting when it was
consigned to an art dealer in Rhode Island to be sold.24 The Estate
claimed that the painting had belonged to Dr. Stern prior to its
being auctioned off in 1937 in Germany pursuant to orders Dr.
18. For a comprehensive table of cases litigated in this area of the law, see
Kreder, supra note 7, at 133-37.
19. I have chosen to disregard the normal convention in the United States
of referring shorthand to a case by the name of the plaintiff, partly because
much of the literature in Germany discusses the case by reference to the
defendant, Maria Louise Bissonnette and her family. Vineberg was an attorney
and fiduciary for the Stern estate, and the case was captioned accordingly. But
Vineberg himself laid no claim to an interest in the property in dispute.
20. See Gold, supra note 2 at 20 (“Another speculative explanation for her
weak and fluctuating legal arguments may be that Bissonnette was focused
predominately on the restoration of her family name rather than possession of
the painting . . .”).
21. See Burris, supra note 2, at 412 (Footnotes appended to Bissonnette
decision serve as “admonitions to counsel who might otherwise be tempted to
overstate the precedent.”).
22. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3. See also Klaus Schurig, Nazibeflecktes Kunsteigentum und die USA, in EIN MENSCHENGERECHTES
STRAFRECHT ALS LEBENSAUFGABE 1329, 1332 (2015) (accusing the District of
Rhode Island of bending the facts in order to obtain a certain result).
23. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
24. Id. at 304.
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Stern received at that time from Nazi officials.
Dr. Stern was well known in his day as an art collector and
dealer in Germany and works that were in his collection are still
exhibited to this day.25 Dr. Stern was the sole owner of an art gallery
he had inherited from his father called the Galerie Stern in
Dusseldorf.26 The Complaint filed by the Estate in Rhode Island
alleged that the Reich Chamber for Visual Arts forcibly took the
painting from Dr. Stern around 1937.27 Specifically, the Complaint
alleged that the Reich Chamber for Visual Arts ordered Dr. Stern
to sell or liquidate his inventory in 1935 and that, because he was a
Jew, he was prohibited from further operating his art gallery.28 The
order left Dr. Stern with no choice but to relinquish his inventory,
including the painting in question, to Lempertz.29 Lempertz sold
much of Dr. Stern’s inventory in November of 1937.30 According to
the Complaint, many of the pieces were sold at prices below the
market value at the time.31 Further, the German government froze
Dr. Stern’s assets upon learning that he had left Germany; thus, he
never received the proceeds of the sale by Lempertz.32
The defendant in the case, Rhode Island resident Maria Louise
Bissonnette, inherited the painting from her mother, whose
husband (Bissonnette’s stepfather) purchased it in 1937 from
Lempertz.33 The painting had been in Bissonnette’s possession in
Providence, Rhode Island, since 1959.34 Once the painting was
consigned to an art dealer, the Estate learned of the painting’s
location and filed a claim with the Holocaust Claims Processing
Office in New York (“HCPO”) in the same year.35 The HCPO, acting
on behalf of the Estate, sent a demand letter to Bissonnette seeking
restitution of the painting.36 After negotiations between HCPO and
Bissonnette broke down and Bissonnette refused to return the
painting, the Estate learned in 2006 that Bissonnette had shipped
the painting to Germany in order to establish its legal title.37
During the discovery phase of the litigation, Bissonnette did
not dispute any of the basic facts the Estate asserted as it related to
25. Angelina Giovani, Max Stern: His Art Legacy and an Abruptly Cancelled
Exhibition of Works from the Galerie Stern in Dusseldorf, ASS’N FOR RESEARCH
INTO CRIMES AGAINST ART BLOG (June 27, 2020), www.art-crime.blogspot.com/
2017/11/max-stern-his-art-legacy-and-abruptly.html.
26. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 303.
30. Id. at 303.
31. Complaint ¶ 22, Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300 (No. 1:06-cv-00211ML-LDA).
32. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the forced sale of the painting or her stepfather’s purchase of the
work, though she did dispute many others.38 The District of Rhode
Island consequently entered judgment in favor of the Estate at the
summary judgment phase of the proceedings.39
1. The Court’s Judgment in Bissonnette
During the discovery stage of the proceedings, the defendant
had either agreed to the most important facts the Estate pleaded or
failed to plead its defenses properly.40 The Estate succeeded at the
summary judgment stage because the defendant failed to produce
specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, that would have
established issues that could be presented to a jury for trial.41 Thus,
pursuant to the well-settled summary judgment standard utilized
by United States courts, the court granted the Estate’s summary
judgment motion.42 The defendant further acquiesced to Rhode
Island law as governing the dispute.43 This, coupled with the failure
of Bissonnette’s defense counsel to plead her case properly and
present her defenses, paved the way for the court to rule in favor of
the Estate’s replevin claim.
a. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Before the District of Rhode Island ruled on the substantive
claim the Estate lodged, it had to resolve several threshold matters.
It determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case
through diversity jurisdiction because the litigants were from
different states and the amount in controversy also met the
statutory minimum.44 The court also briefly discussed the law
applicable to the dispute, ruling that Rhode Island law governed all
of the issues presented by the parties.45 The defendant argued in
one of her earlier pleadings in a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss that
the case ought to be tried in Germany and not in Rhode Island.46
However, she ultimately did not dispute the application of Rhode
38. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts at
1, Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300 (No. 1:06-cv-00211-ML-LDA).
39. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
40. Id. at 305.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 303 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
43. Id. at 305 (“Defendant does not address the Stern Estate’s choice of law
argument . . .”).
44. Id. at 304. Personal jurisdiction was not an issue. According to the
Complaint, the Estate was a citizen and domiciliary of Canada, while Ms.
Bissonnette was a citizen and domiciliary of Rhode Island. Complaint ¶¶ 2-3,
supra note 31.
45. Id. at 304-05.
46. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3-11, Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300
(No. 1:06-cv-00211-ML-LDA).
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Island law in her motion opposing summary judgment.47 This
omission on the part of the defendant led the court to find that the
defendant had agreed with the Estate’s choice of Rhode Island law
as providing the basis for a successful replevin action in the case.48
The court, citing case law authority, explained that the parties must
elaborate a choice of law argument at the summary judgment stage,
and if they do not do so the court considers a choice-of-law argument
waived.49 When a choice-of-law argument is waived, courts apply
the law of the forum – here, the law of the state of Rhode Island.50
For this reason, the court did not engage in a lengthy discussion of
the issue or bring up international private law rules.
b. The Estate’s Replevin Claim
The Bissonnette decision is remarkable because the court
determined that the circumstances surrounding the sale in 1937 of
the painting in question constituted a forced sale and equated the
sale with theft.51 Key to any successful claim to recover art looted
during the Nazi regime is a basic notion in American property law
that not even a good faith purchaser can acquire good title to stolen
property.52 The rule has also been expressed as simply as: a thief
cannot pass good title.53 Rhode Island and New York follow this
rule.54 It is also expressed by the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non
habet – namely, that one cannot convey more rights than one has.55
While this maxim generally governs who is the true owner in an
ownership dispute in most Western nations, other variables, such
as the applicable statute of limitations or the identity of the seller
and the type of sale, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and affect
47. Defendant’s Motion in Opposition of Summary Judgment, Bissonnette,
529 F. Supp. 2d 300 (No. 1:06-cv-00211-ML-LDA);
48. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 305 n.9 (“In fact, it appears that
Defendant agrees that Rhode Island law applies to the replevin claim[.]”).
49. Id. at 305.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 308. (“The Court concludes that the Painting was taken unlawfully
from Dr. Stern.”).
52. Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-Looted Art: Report from the Front
Lines, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 299 (2001) (citing Autocephalous GreekOrthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1398 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990)).
53. Reif v. Nagy, No. 161799/2015, 2018 WL 1638805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Apr. 5, 2018) (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311,
320 (1991)). U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2012) (“A purchaser of goods acquires all title
which his transferor had or had power to transfer . . .”); accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 & cmt. D (1965).
54. As will be discussed below, absent other choice-of-law considerations, a
federal court generally applies the substantive law of the state in which it sits
when the court has diversity jurisdiction over the case. Erie v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
55. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith
Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1335 (2011).

556

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

the application of the principle. An original owner may indeed be
deemed to retain superior title, as explained below, but these
variables often have the effect of weakening the rule in favor of a
good faith purchaser.56
In this case, the Estate asserted a claim for replevin, which is
an action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully taken
by the defendant.57 Replevin is asserted ex delicto - that is, it is a
tort action.58 An action for replevin in the state of Rhode Island
requires the plaintiff to prove (1) that it is the lawful owner of the
property; (2) that the property was taken unlawfully from the
plaintiff; and (3) the defendant is in wrongful possession of the
property.59
The court, in its decision, adopted the Estate’s contention that
the Lempertz catalog used during the auction of Dr. Stern’s gallery
inventory had identified the painting in question as part of the
auction.60 To support further the proposition that the painting
indeed belonged to Dr. Stern, the court cited a 1964 restitution
decision, discussed in greater depth below, by the Regional Court of
Dusseldorf that awarded Dr. Stern offset damages.61 The decision
listed the market value of the paintings taken from Dr. Stern; the
list included the painting at issue in the case.62 Based on these
findings, as well as the fact that Dr. Stern bequeathed the residue
of his property to the Estate, the court held that the Estate was the
lawful owner of the painting, thereby satisfying the first prong of a
Rhode Island replevin action.63
The court next held that the painting was taken unlawfully
from Dr. Stern. In so doing, it accepted the assertions made in a
report submitted to the court by an expert in the field of World War
II history (the so-called “Nicholas Declaration”).64 According to
Nicholas, the methods the Gestapo used to force Dr. Stern to sell
the painting amounted to theft.65 The court again cited the Regional
Court of Dusseldorf’s finding that the Lempertz auction was a
“distressed sale” in which Dr. Stern was forced to participate.66 On
this basis, the court, citing New York law, agreed with the
proposition that the Nazi party’s actions “in this instance are
properly classified as looting or stealing.”67 Specifically:
56. Id.
57. Replevin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
58. Id. (citing JOSEPH ELLIOTT COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF REPLEVIN 3 (2d ed. 1900)).
59. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d. at 306.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 307.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 306-07, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 811
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[the] Nazi party could not convey good title to art taken during war
because seizure of art during wartime constituted “pillage, or plunder
. . . [which is the] taking of private property not necessary for the
immediate prosecution of [the] war effort, and is unlawful.”68

As a result, the court concluded that the painting at issue was
unlawfully taken from Dr. Stern, thereby satisfying the second
prong of the Estate’s replevin claim.69
Finally, the court held that Bissonnette was in wrongful
possession of the painting. The Estate argued that Bissonnette’s
stepfather could not be deemed a bona fide purchaser of the painting
because the Lempertz auction was a result of an order from a regime
that persecuted Jews, among others, and forcibly dispossessed Dr.
Stern of his property.70 The court, citing a litany of cases from
various United States jurisdictions confirming the basic rule that a
thief acquires no title, can therefore not transfer title, and the
original owner’s title is not extinguished as a result of a pillage,
accepted the Plaintiff’s assertion in light of the Defendant’s failure
to plead properly facts to the contrary.71
c.

Defenses
i.

Statute of Limitations

The court quickly disposed of the statute limitations issue. It
held that the Estate’s claim was not barred by any applicable
statute of limitations. This holding was predicated on the fact that
the defendant failed to present an adequate argument with respect
to the applicable statute of limitations. The result of this omission
is that the court considered the defendant to have waived the
defense.72 The court cited a number of well-settled cases setting
forth the basic rule that in order to assert a defense properly based
on an applicable statute of limitations, it is not enough simply to
assert the affirmative defense in an answer to a complaint. Rather,
the defense must also be submitted to the court at the appropriate
stage of the proceedings (summary judgment), and the defense must
be supplemented by a legal argument.73
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), aff’d, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div.
1967)).
68. Id.
69. See id. The court noted that the Defendant had attempted to argue
whether the painting in question was in fact stolen and submitted two
declarations by German attorneys on the issue, but the court rejected the effort
on procedural grounds, stating that the defense failed to make a proper
argument in its opposition to summary judgment supporting these assertions.
Id.
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 305.
73. See id. (noting in its discussion of the statute of limitations issue that
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Laches

The court rejected the laches defense Bissonnette asserted.74
Laches requires: (1) that there be negligence on the part of the
plaintiff leading to a delay in bringing a claim and (2) that “the delay
must prejudice the defendant.”75 Further, the court, citing
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church v. Goldberg,76 a case from
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
dating back to 1990, reasoned that it should determine if the
plaintiff’s efforts to locate the painting were reasonable in a
contextual analysis of the chaotic events of World War II.77 Using
this standard, the Bissonnette Court held that under the
circumstances present in this case, Dr. Stern’s efforts to relocate his
paintings were reasonable.78 It would have been unreasonable, the
court explained, to require Dr. Stern, with the benefit of hindsight,
to do more than he did in this particular case (his efforts to recover
the piece in question will be discussed in more detail in Sections C
and D).79
The doctrine of laches also requires that the plaintiff’s
negligence prejudiced the defendant. Bissonnette argued that she
was prejudiced because she was subjected to protracted litigation
over the painting and, as a result, her family name had been
disparaged.80 Bissonnette also complained that she had to change
her position because it was likely she would have sold the painting
and benefited from the sale.81 In response, the court did not go into
great depths explaining what constitutes prejudice in terms of a
laches defense. Rather, citing case law for general propositions, the
court reviewed Bissonnette’s allegations and ruled that those
allegations did not meet the standard for prejudice.82

III. ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As noted at the outset here, two important considerations must
be made in adjudicating ownership disputes over works of art that
the defendant failed to address other important issues and that therefore the
defendant waived those arguments).
74. Id. at 310.
75. Id. at 309 (citing Fitzgerald v. O’Connell, 120 R.I. 240, 386 A.2d 1384
(1978)).
76. Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church v. Goldberg, 917 F.2d 278, 289
(7th Cir. 1990).
77. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
78. Id. at 310.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 311.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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were purportedly stolen by the Nazis in the period surrounding and
during World War II. They are: (1) the venue chosen by the plaintiff
and (2) the choice of law applicable to the dispute. The Estate was
a domiciliary of Canada.83 The defendant was a citizen of Rhode
Island, and the property at issue in the case had been located in
Rhode Island for a number of years.84 At a minimum, the Estate had
two choices for judicial venue: the Superior Court of Rhode Island,
the court of first instance on the state level in Rhode Island, and the
District of Rhode Island, a federal court. Congress, by enacting 28
U.S.C. § 1332, implemented Article III, § 2 of the United States
Constitution and granted jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases
between citizens of a state and citizens of a foreign state as long as
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.85 This is known as
“diversity jurisdiction.” Part of the rationale for this grant of
original jurisdiction to federal courts, which otherwise may only
hear claims involving a federal question,86 referred to as “federalquestion jurisdiction,” was that out-of-state litigants should not be
subjected to a defendant’s “home court advantage.” In other words,
it allows litigants who are not citizens of the state in which they
bring suit to have access to an impartial forum.87 On account of its
foreign citizenship, the Estate was therefore entitled pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) to bring suit in federal court and ultimately
chose to file its Complaint there rather than in Rhode Island state
court.

B. Choice of Law
While the court in Bissonnette did not engage in a choice-of-law
analysis, we can consider here what the outcome might have been
had the Defendant argued, for example, that German law ought to
be applied in the case. We can also look to other United States
jurisdictions that have dealt with similar art restitution cases for
insight into how these analyses have been undertaken by the courts
there. These cases share similarities with Bissonnette but also are
distinguishable enough that they must be evaluated with caution in
drawing any conclusions as to the consistent and uniform
application of choice-of-law principles in cases of disputed artwork.
That being said, based on the factors listed above, the Bissonnette
court would have applied Rhode Island law in the event a choice-oflaw argument had been put forward by the parties.
83. Id. at 305.
84. Id. at 303.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) (2018).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
87. See e.g. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The power of Congress to confer such jurisdiction
was based on the desire of the Framers to assure out-of-state litigants courts
[that are] free from susceptibility to potential local bias.”).
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1. Erie and its Progeny
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, a seminal case handed down in
1938, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal courts
sitting in diversity do not have the power to create “federal common
law.”88 The result of Erie, therefore, was that on remand the
Southern District of New York, sitting in diversity jurisdiction was
required to follow the law of Pennsylvania in deciding the plaintiff’s
tort claim.89 In so holding, the Erie court established the rule that
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must not only apply
the positive statutory law of the states, but also the common (or
decisional) law as state courts create and interpret. Erie enshrined
the rule that federal courts generally must apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law.90
But Erie itself left a number of questions unanswered. The
substantive versus procedural distinction was gradually sharpened
in a number of cases creating a general doctrine governing choiceof-law issues in diversity jurisdiction situations, referred to often as
“Erie and its progeny.”91 An early case after Erie established the
rule that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction generally
must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.92 For
example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York sitting in Brooklyn must apply the choice-of-law rules
of the State of New York.
Every state has its own substantive choice-of-law rules. The
litigants before a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction bear
the responsibility to plead properly to the court, in accordance with
the state’s choice-of-law rules, which law should apply in resolving
the dispute before it. Should the parties fail to do so properly, a
choice-of-law argument is deemed waived by the court and the law
of the forum state will apply.93 United States courts do not generally
operate according to the maxim iura novit curia – the court knows
the law. Rather, it is incumbent on the parties to plead and argue
their cases in order to avoid risking a determination by the court
that a particular argument or defense has been waived. It is not a
foregone conclusion, therefore, that, because a case is brought in the
District of Rhode Island that the law of the State of Rhode Island
should or will apply in resolving the dispute. Each state applies its
88. Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine (and What Does it Mean
for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
245, 247-48 (2008).
89. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
90. Steinman, supra note 88, at 258 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 80).
91. See e.g. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466 (1965).
92. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Hall v. Eklof
Marine Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.R.I. 2004).
93. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (citing Bergin v. Dartmouth Pharm.,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 179, 180 n.1 (D. Mass. 2004)).
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own choice of law rules – the same way a German court applies its
own choice-of-law rules in multi-jurisdictional cases.94 In
accordance with the state's choice-of-law rules, the parties may
argue that a law other than that of the state in which the court sits
must apply to the dispute. The default rule in Rhode Island, like
most states, is that the law of the forum applies unless the parties
argue otherwise.95
In this case, the trial court ruled that the law of the State of
Rhode Island applied to the Estate’s replevin claim.96 The choice-oflaw issue was not significantly contested in the district court, nor
did the Defendant challenge the district court’s choice-of-law
determination on appeal. Therefore, the district court simply
applied the law of the state of Rhode Island, and this determination
was left undisturbed on appeal. Had the defendant properly
asserted at the correct stage of the lower court proceedings, for
example, that German law should apply to the dispute, she would
have had to argue that German law must apply to the estate’s claim
in accordance with the Rhode Island conflicts-of-law rules. As
further explained below, the court at that point would review the
applicable German law and apply Rhode Island’s choice-of-law rules
in light of its German-law review.
As discussed above, a replevin action is a tort action. European
jurisdictions, like American jurisdictions, emphasize the nature of
the claim, the location and domicile of the respective parties, and
the place where a transaction or injury occurred (e.g. contract,
delict, criminal, proprietary (dingliche Rechte in Germany)),97 in
order to distinguish applicable choice-of-law rules (e.g. forum
delicti, forum rei sitae, forum contractus). Therefore, it is necessary
to ascertain which of the various conflicts-of-law analyses has been

94. Heinz-Peter Mansel, Die Bedeutung des internationalen Privatrechts in
Bezug auf das Herausgabeverlangen des Eigentümers bei abhanden
gekommenen
Kulturgütern,
in
KOORDINIERUNGSSTELLE
FÜR
KULTURGÜTERVERLUSTE
MAGDEBURG
UND
BEAUFTRAGTER
DER
BUNDESREGIERUNG FÜR KULTUR UND MEDIEN (HRSG), IM LABYRINTH DES
RECHTS? WEGE ZUM KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZ 139 (2007) (“In the event the
complaint seeking recovery of property is lodged with a court of international
jurisdiction, the court applies the international private law of the state in which
the court is located in order to ascertain the applicable law.”).
95. Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 973
(R.I. 2008) (“[A court] need not engage in a choice-of-law analysis when no
conflict-of-law issue is presented to the court.”).
96. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 304. I should also note here that, when
Rhode Island law itself does not appear to provide a definitive answer to a
question of law, I have included legal analysis from other jurisdictions, most
notably New York – a major marketplace for famous works of art. These other
jurisdictions have dealt with the issues raised in Bissonnette since they are both
marketplaces for these works and are hosts to cultural institutions that are
likely to be affected by these types of claims. Moreover, the Bissonnette Court
itself cited New York law to support its holding.
97. Heinz-Peter Mansel, supra note 94, at 135.
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adopted by the respective forum. Five states, including Rhode
Island to some extent, use the so-called “Leflar” approach, based on
a seminal 1966 law review article by Professor Robert Leflar.98
Some states, such as New York, engage in an interest analysis.
Others follow the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Law, which
sets forth an analysis based on which forum has the most significant
relationship to the facts of the case. Many follow a combination of
the various approaches, making it difficult to say definitively which
approach is controlling in the jurisdiction.
2. Moving from Lex Loci Delicti to Leflar and the Second
Restatement of Conflicts of Laws
Most states, including Rhode Island, have departed from
applying a pure lex loci delicti analysis99 for tort claims. They now
engage in an analysis of interests or apply the law of the forum with
the most significant relationship to the claim.100 This most popular
conflicts-of-law approach is reflected in the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws and favors application of the law of the jurisdiction
that has the most significant relationship or most significant
contacts to the facts of the case.101 Rhode Island, however, follows
both an interest-analysis approach, also addressed as the Leflar or
“better law” approach, and the Restatement’s “most significant
relationship” approach for tort claims.102 This means a Rhode Island
court weighs the following considerations:
(1) predictability of result;
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order;
(3) simplification of the judicial task;
(4) advancement of the forum’s governmental interest; and
(5) application of the better rule of law.103

98. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966); Mark Thomson, Method or
Madness: The Leflar Approach to Choice of Law as Practiced in Five States, 66
RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 86 (2013).
99. See e.g. Ingram v. Davol, Inc., C.A. No. PC 07-4701, 2011 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 17 (Feb. 9, 2011) (“The Rhode Island Supreme Court abandoned the
doctrine of lex loci delicti because ‘the interest-weighing approach to conflict of
law cases is indeed the better rule, and justice will be more equitably
administered if the Rhode Island courts apply that rule to tort conflicts cases
coming before them.’” (quoting Woodward v. Stewart 104 R.I. 299, 243 A.2d 923
(1968))).
100. Thomson, supra note 98, at 86.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 112 (discussing how most conflicts-of-law analysts agree that
Rhode Island heavily relies on a significant contacts approach in resolving
conflicts-of-law questions).
103. Najaran v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., 768 A.2d 1253, 1255 (R.I. 2001)
(quoting Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1351 (R.I. 1986)).
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In addition, in a Rhode Island tort case, determining the forum with
the most significant relationship to the claim (the “Restatement
standard” or “significant contacts” test) requires the court to assess
the following contacts:
(1) the place where the injury occurred;
(2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties; and
(4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.104

3. Application of the Leflar and the Restatement Standards
in Rhode Island
Rhode Island courts would analyze the tort-specific factors
outlined above – that is, the Restatement “most significant
relationship” analysis. As will be discussed below in greater detail,
the Bissonnette court found that the Estate had shown that it was
the lawful owner of the painting and that Bissonnette was
wrongfully in possession of it.105 The court had also equated the
forced sale of the painting in dispute with theft.106 It is, therefore,
more than reasonable to assume that, had the Bissonnette court
been faced with a properly pleaded dispute over the law applicable
to the disposition of the case, it would have reviewed the German
law and decided that Rhode Island law should apply to the case. A
review of the foreign law argued by one of the parties is generally a
component of a choice-of-law determination.107 However, a review of
foreign law does not necessarily mean that a United States court
will select such law as controlling. One New York court held, for
example:
After a review of Swiss law, this Court holds that it need not consider
those laws during the pendency of this action as New York has a
stronger interest in protecting its valuable art market from plundered

104. Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 326-27, 252
A.2d 176, 179 (1969) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145(2) (1968)).
105. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (“This Court concludes, therefore,
that Defendant is in wrongful possession of the Painting.”).
106. Id. (holding that the Painting was taken unlawfully from Dr. Stern
after discussion of expert opinion that had concluded: “the ‘methods used by the
Gestapo and the Nazis to force Dr. Max Stern to sell the [P]ainting . . . amount
to theft’”).
107. Indeed, one might ask why a court would need to review foreign law at
all in order to conclude, for example, that states such as New York or Rhode
Island have the greater interest in applying their law to the case at hand. It
appears that the decision as to which law should be applied depends to some
extent on the outcome the court establishes would be reached by applying the
various laws as pleaded by the parties.
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goods.108

A New York court would apply the law of New York to these
set of facts on the grounds, among others, that it has an interest in
protecting its valuable market from plundered goods.109 Rhode
Island could rest, however, on additional reasons to find the
application of Rhode Island law in harmony with its choice-of-law
rules. In Rhode Island, the Restatement “significant contacts”
standard is an important element in evaluating the first Leflar
criterion.110 This element, however, does not always play a
significant role in unplanned torts or in situations where the parties
have not had any particular relationship. “Predictability of result”
generally refers to the ability of parties to a transaction to plan a
desired result, such as where a lawsuit might be brought in relation
to a transaction.111 Choosing the applicable law based on
predictability promotes planning and reliance and discourages
forum shopping.112 This consideration is of less importance in tort
cases, where the location of an accident or tortious action is not
typically planned. In tort cases, predictability can be promoted by
looking to the place where the tortious conduct occurred in order to
choose the applicable law. The application of this element is further
supported by consideration of the first two prongs of the
Restatement “significant relationship” test: (a) the place where the
injury occurred and (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred.113
In this case, the injury can be said to have both occurred in
Germany and Rhode Island. The theft that the court found took
place occurred in Germany.114 The sale and transfer to Bissonnette’s
stepfather took place in Germany. Bissonnette’s unlawful
possession of the piece, however, persisted for decades in Rhode
Island. In Charash v. Oberlin College,115 a case involving a dispute
over the law applicable to a conversion116 claim for misappropriated
drawings, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, applying the same Restatement analysis, held that if a
conversion has been committed, “the resulting rights and liabilities
of the parties will be determined by the local law of the state . . .
[that] has the most significant relationship to the occurrence, the
108. Gowen v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 60 Misc. 3d 963, 992 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2018) (citing Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2010)).
109. See e.g. Bakalar, 619 F.3d 136, 141 (“The manner in which the New
York rule is applied reflects overarching concern that New York not become a
marketplace for stolen goods and, in particular, for stolen artwork.”).
110. See Thomson, supra note 98, at 114.
111. Id. at 87
112. Id. at 87.
113. Id. at 98.
114. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
115. Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1994).
116. Conversion is “the wrongful possession or disposition of another’s
property as if it were one’s own.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 356 (8th ed. 2004).
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chattels and the parties.”117 The court went on to explain that a
conversion does not only occur when there is a taking, but also when
someone exercises dominion over the property without the owner’s
consent.118 The law of Rhode Island is the same:
Replevin is a statutory action in [Rhode Island] . . . . It is available to
persons claiming possession of goods or chattels either wrongfully
taken or wrongfully detained. Nothing more than the right of
present possession, founded upon a general or special ownership of
the goods or chattels, is necessary to enable a plaintiff to
maintain the action.119

We can say, therefore, that while the actual theft of the Dr.
Stern painting occurred in Germany, the place of injury was also in
Rhode Island. The painting had been kept in Rhode Island for
decades, and, consequently, conversion of the painting had occurred
there on an ongoing basis. As for the remaining two Restatement
factors, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered, a
Rhode Island court would find the defendant’s Rhode Island
residency as an additional factor weighing in favor of the
application of Rhode Island law. The court would likely find it
within the reasonable expectation of the parties that personal
property subject to a lawsuit on the basis of conversion be governed
by the law of the jurisdiction where the property had been located
for over forty years.120
With regard to the remaining Leflar standards, the forum’s
governmental interest factor is given the most attention by Rhode
Island courts.121 Conversely, the simplification of the judicial task
factor is almost never significantly addressed in Rhode Island
conflict-of-law decisions.122 It is plausible to infer that Rhode Island
courts would view the governmental interest of the State of Rhode
Island as outweighing the selection of German law to apply to the
case, much in the same way this has been done by courts in New
York. In Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, the defendant
in that case had also purchased and had been in unlawful
possession of stolen artwork in New York, with the theft having
117. Charash, 14 F.3d 291 at 296 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAW §147).
118. Id.
119. Brunswick Corp. v. Sposato, 389 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I. 1978) (citing
Clyde Dye & Print Works, Inc. v. Craig, 157 A. 425, 426 (1931) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
120. See e.g. Najarian, 768 A.2d at 1255 (reciting the contacts to be
considered in determining which law applies, such as “(a) the place where the
injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c)
the domicile, residence . . . of the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered”).
121. Thomson, supra note 98, at 117.
122. Id.
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occurred in Germany.123 The court wrote:
The fact that the theft of the paintings did not occur in New York is
of no relevance. In applying the New York rule that a purchaser
cannot acquire good title from a thief, New York courts do not
concern themselves with the question of where the theft took
place, but simply whether one took place. Similarly, the
residence of the true owner is not significant for the New York policy
is not to protect resident owners, but to protect owners generally as a
means to preserve the integrity of transactions and prevent the state
from becoming a marketplace for stolen goods.124

The court in Kunstsammlung further explained that while New
York courts follow an interest analysis in resolving conflict-of-law
questions, the result would not have changed had the court followed
the Restatement “significant relationship” test.125 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, as well, has emphasized the place of injury as being
a significant factor in its choice of law analysis.126 In fact, in
personal injury cases Rhode Island courts often employ a
presumption that the law of the place where an injury was
sustained controls.127 It is, therefore, likely the Bissonnette court
would have reached the same decision in the event the parties had
contested the choice-of-law issue.
On the other hand, there have been cases where courts have
applied the law of a foreign nation in cases involving Nazi-looted
art. In Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, the Southern District of
New York, applying a New York choice-of-law analysis, held that
German law applied to the issue of duress applicable to forced sales
in 1933 of Picasso paintings Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy
owned.128 The court applied New York’s governmental interest
analysis to what it categorized as a contract issue, deciding that the
factors used in that choice-of-law analysis clearly supported the
application of German law to the question of duress.129 The court’s
analysis did not end there, however. Because the paintings were
then resold in 1936 from Switzerland to a resident of New York (a
Mr. William Paley) who ultimately willed it to the Museum of
Modern Art, the museum had a good-faith-purchaser defense.130
Here, the choice was between Swiss law and New York law. The
Southern District of New York applied an interest analysis but also
invoked the Restatement significant relationship test and decided
123. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
124. Id. at 846 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Najarian, 768 A.2d at 1255.
127. Thomson, supra note 98, at 113 (citing Blais v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
526 A.2d 854, 856-57 (R.I. 1987)).
128. Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 467.
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in favor of New York law with respect to the issue of the sale to
Paley.131 Among the reasons cited by the court, one of the most
pertinent was that the painting had been immediately shipped from
Switzerland to New York upon its purchase and then remained in
New York for over seventy years after its arrival.132
Therefore, as in Bissonnette, we see that the place where the
artwork in dispute has resided, particularly if it has been more than
a few decades, can weigh heavily in favor of choosing the law of the
forum applying a significant relationship test. As a general rule,
therefore, the situs of the res will be found to be significantly
connected to the dispute, which means the law most often chosen in
such cases is in fact the law of the forum.133 In this case, the District
of Rhode Island, if presented properly with the choice of law issue,
would have chosen the law of the State of Rhode Island to apply to
the action for replevin.

C. Defenses of Statute of Limitations/Laches
1. Statute of Limitations
a. Procedural versus Substantive Right
While a statute of limitations was traditionally viewed as
substantive law for Erie purposes, its effect is largely procedural –
that is to say, the underlying substantive claim does not necessarily
extinguish.134 New York courts, for example, follow this approach
with respect to the question of superior title to a chattel that is
possessed by a good faith purchaser.135 Statutes of limitations in
New York have long been considered part of New York's procedural
law because “they are deemed as pertaining to the remedy rather
than the right.”136 New York courts have described New York's
procedural characterization of statutes of limitation as follows:
[t]he theory of the statute of limitations generally followed in New
York is that the passing of the applicable period does not wipe out a
substantive right; it merely suspends the remedy.137

131. Id. at 468.
132. Id.
133. Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in
Litigation between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art,
50 DUKE L .J. 955, 1037 (2001).
134. See e.g. Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (Scalia, J.)
(“For purposes of Erie . . . for example, statutes of limitations are treated as
substantive.” (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945)).
135. Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., 93 N.Y.2d 48, 55 (1999).
136. 2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp., 103 N.E.3d 774, 777
(N.Y. 2018) (quoting Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC v King, 14 N.Y.3d 410, 416
(2010)).
137. Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06671, 144
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Statutes of limitations applicable to claims for replevin or
conversion are typically three years. The important question,
however, is when the statute of limitations begins to run. In some
jurisdictions the statute may run as soon as the theft occurs. In
others, it may begin to run when the wrongful possession is
discovered, or when a demand for return of the item is made and
the wrongful possessor refuses. Additionally, in order to toll the
statute of limitations after the theft, many jurisdictions require a
level of reasonable diligence on the part of the alleged owner in
attempting to locate the missing or stolen property.
b. Demand/Refusal Rule & Discovery Rule
The limitations law of most states in replevin actions,
including Rhode Island, requires application of the “discovery rule”
when determining when the statute of limitations begins to run.
The discovery rule limits tort or contract actions, as well as actions
for replevin, to three years after the cause of action accrues.138
Courts have held that an action accrues using a reasonableness test
– that is when the person bringing suit should have reasonably
discovered the basis for their claim.139 States applying the discovery
rule in lost art cases generally impose a burden on the plaintiff to
show: (1) it lacked actual knowledge of the basis for its claim and
(2) that its lack of knowledge was objectionably reasonable.140
Another approach, such as that of New York, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until a demand is made by a
purported owner of a chattel and the possessor refuses to hand it
over.141 Not until the refusal is expressed by the current, allegedly
unlawful possessor, does the statute of limitations clock begin.142
The trial court in Bissonnette held that the demand-andrefusal rule does not apply to replevin actions.143 Thus, in order to
commence a replevin action, the plaintiff need not first show it made
a demand and it was refused. However, the court did not address
whether demand and refusal were necessary to commence the
statute of limitations. The existing case law in Rhode Island reveals
that it generally follows the discovery rule in tort cases, as opposed
A.D.3d 122, 39 N.Y.S.3d 10 (App. Div.) (citing Tanges v Heidelberg N. Am., Inc.
(93 N.Y.2d 48, 55 (1999)). As a consequence, application of the statute of
limitations may preclude an original owner from recovering a chattel from a
good faith purchaser but applying New York’s statute of limitations does not
extinguish the original owner’s superior title. This effectively renders the item
unmarketable.
138. See e.g. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 2A).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 302 n.3.
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to the demand-and-refusal rule.144 But the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has held in certain types of tort cases, including conversion,
that a demand/refusal rule applies.145 Nevertheless, the discovery
rule states that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence, should have
discovered, the wrongful conduct of the defendant.146 This rule, as
pointed out by commentators, is highly fact specific.147 The rule
requires plaintiffs to show when it discovered the wrong and that
such point in time was reasonable to begin running the statute of
limitations. What is reasonable depends on the ability of the
plaintiff to ascertain in the first place at what point it was wronged
by the defendant. In this case, it is likely that the trial court would
have ruled that the Estate’s claim would not be barred by the
statute of limitations for reasons explained below.
2. The Statute of Limitations and Application of Laches are
Interwoven
In cases where property has been converted and the original
owner seeks recovery of it, the equitable doctrine of laches may
affect whether a statute of limitations is imposed in order to bar the
claim. The doctrine is invoked in both demand/refusal and discovery
rule jurisdictions. Laches generally requires a reasonable amount
of diligence on the part of someone bringing a claim so that when
the claim is finally brought it does not unreasonably prejudice the
opposing party. At the very least, therefore, its application may
frustrate a court’s finding that the statute of applications does not
bar the replevin claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
discussed laches in-depth when affirming the District of Rhode
Island’s judgment in Bissonnette.148 The doctrine of laches asks
whether a person bringing a claim to recover property unreasonably
delayed pursuing the claim and whether such delay unduly
prejudiced the defendant.149 If the court finds in the affirmative on
both of these points, it will rule that the claim is barred under the

144. See e.g. Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 490 A.2d 43, 46-47 (R.I. 1985) (holding
that the discovery rule applies to drug products liability cases); see also Lee v.
Morin, 469 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1983) (extending discovery rule to latent
construction defects).
145. Fuscellaro v. Indus. Nat’l Corp., 368 A.2d 1227, 1230 (R.I. 1977) (“It is
well-established that a demand and refusal are usually required before an
action for conversion can be brought against the possessor of a chattel who has
rightfully obtained possession from one not its owner.” (internal citations
omitted).).
146. Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 2003) (citing Supreme Bakery,
Inc. v. Bagley, 742 A.2d 1202, 1204 (R.I, 2000)).
147. See e.g. Kreder, supra note 7, at 103.
148. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d at 57
149. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
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doctrine.150 In Bissonnette, the court rejected the Defendant’s laches
argument. It found that Dr. Stern’s efforts to relocate his paintings
after the war were reasonable on the basis of a “contextual analysis”
of the chaotic events of World War II.151 As discussed below, some
German commentators and the High Regional Court of Cologne
hold the view still, however, that the Estate unreasonably delayed
its pursuit of “Girl from the Sabine Mountains.”152
The defense could have, and did, argue that the Estate knew
or should have known that the painting was misappropriated in the
1930s and that the delay in bringing its claim prejudiced the
Defendant. This argument has been instrumental in other
American cases, where courts applying the discovery rule have held
that the statute of limitations expired well before litigation related
to the artwork commenced.153 In Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin,154
for example, the federal court in the Northern District of Ohio
barred the plaintiff’s claim pursuing restitution and damages for
property she lost as a result of Nazi persecution.155 According to the
court, the plaintiff in that case did not timely file a claim for the
painting that was in the possession of the Toledo Museum of Art
(“TMA”).156 The court stated, among other things, that the plaintiff’s
delay in filing a claim was unreasonable because TMA’s ownership
and possession of the painting was public knowledge and easily
discoverable.157 The court based this ruling simply on the
application of the discovery rule and did not rest its decision on the
application of the laches doctrine.
The defense in Bissonnette not only failed to properly raise the
issue of the statute of limitations and laches, it failed to satisfy the
prejudice standard required under the laches doctrine by pointing
to acceptable evidence of prejudice, such as the unavailability of
witness testimony as a result of the delay.158 Defendant Bissonnette
also failed to proffer any potential evidence that would be favorable
to its case and that had been lost as a result of the Estate’s delay.159
As a result, the Court of Appeals found that the Defendant in
150. Id. at 57 (citing Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 536 F. Supp. at 849–
52) (concluding on motion for summary judgment that plaintiff had not
unreasonably delayed pursuit of claims for paintings stolen during World War
II and, thus, his claims were not barred by statute of limitations), aff'd, 678 F.2d
1150, 1165 (2d Cir. 1982)).
151. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
152. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 ¶40.
153. Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 804 (N.D. Ohio
2006); The Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, 2007 WL 1016996, at 4 (E.D. Mich.
2007); Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658, at
9 (D.Mass. 2009).
154. Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 808.
158. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d at 58.
159. Id. at 57.
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Bissonnette had not been prejudiced within the meaning of the
laches doctrine and therefore refrained from even examining the
reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s delay.160
These cases invoking the doctrine of laches were
distinguishable from the facts in Bissonnette in a number of
significant ways. The Estate had no idea of the painting’s
whereabouts until, as occurred in 2005, it was transferred from
private display to an art dealer for sale. And the court agreed,
finding that, unlike in other cases, the painting was not readily
“susceptible to discovery,” nor was it “drifting in the . . . art
community.”161 Moreover, the Estate supplemented its argument
with testimony that many of the records related to art transactions
stored at Lempertz were destroyed during the course of Allied
bombing making it difficult to ascertain which transactions
involved work belonging to Dr. Stern.162 We shall compare the
Bissonnette’s court treatment of the laches issue to the High
Regional Court’s assertion, discussed in depth below, that the
Estate was not at all diligent in searching for much of the inventory
in Dr. Stern’s gallery.

IV. GERMAN CRITICISM OF BISSONNETTE
A. The High Regional Court of Cologne Disregards the
Bissonnette Decision
In 2016, the High Regional Court of Cologne (“High Regional
Court” or “court”) handed down a judgment in a case that conflicts
to a large extent with the decision in Bissonnette.163 The case in
Cologne involved the claim of Richard Feigen, an art dealer in New
York, who in 2000 purchased a painting by Ludovico Carracci
entitled “Saint Hieronymus with the Lions and two Angels,” at an
auction held by Lempertz in Cologne.164 Feigen subsequently filed
suit in Cologne against Lempertz for compensatory damages when
he learned that the painting was listed on the Art Loss Register and
had belonged to Dr. Stern.165 The painting was eventually returned
to the Estate by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with
Feigen’s acquiescence.
Feigen’s complaint alleged, among other things, that he was
due just compensation for the painting because it was encumbered
with a legal defect pursuant to §434 BGB (German Civil Code) when

160. Id.
161. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (citing Erisoty v. Rizik, 1995 WL
91406 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).
162. Complaint at 6, Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300.
163. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3.
164. Id. at ¶ 1.
165. Id.
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he purchased it from Lempertz.166 The High Regional Court upheld
on appeal a local court’s dismissal of Feigen’s complaint.167 It did so
on the basis of a judgment grounded entirely on conventional
doctrinal legal analysis, what Germans would refer to as
rechtsdogmatische Analyse.168 It should be noted that the court did
not dismiss Feigen’s case on procedural grounds, but substantively
addressed the legal issues surrounding the Carracci work.
The judgment, while acknowledging that the actions by the
Gestapo resulting in the forced auction of Dr. Stern’s gallery were
tantamount to theft at that time, nevertheless held that Feigen was
a good faith purchaser under German law.169 Among other things,
the court found that the painting at issue could no longer be
considered stolen under German law, and called into question some
of the factual assertions contained in the Bissonnette decision as
they related to Dr. Stern’s interactions with the Nazi regime.170 The
court acknowledged various commitments agreed to internationally
after the war, such as the Washington Conference Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art, but it declined to apply them.171
1. The High Regional Court’s Analysis: Feigen Was a Good
Faith Purchaser Under German Law
In holding that Feigen was a good faith purchaser of the
painting,172 the court first turned to an analysis of choice-of-law
principles and found that German law applied to the transfer of title
resulting from the 2000 Lempertz auction since the property was
located in Germany at that time (lex rei sitae).173 The court then
turned to an analysis of the German Civil Code’s provision on legal
defects in things, §434 BGB in its prior version (§435 today). In one
simple sentence, section 434 BGB required property sold by a seller
to a buyer to be “free of rights that could be asserted by third parties
against the buyer.”174 Feigen relied on this provision to claim that
Lempertz failed to deliver the painting free from potential claims
that could be raised against him by third parties – this despite
reassurances from Lempertz that the provenance of the painting

166. Id. ¶ 32.
167. Id. at ¶ 1.
168. CREIFELDS RECHTSWÖRTERBUCH 1063 (18th ed. 2004).
169. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 at ¶ 33.
170. Id. ¶ 45. (disagreeing with the District of Rhode Island, for example,
that Dr. Stern left Germany before receiving the proceeds of the Lempertz
auction.) Id.
171. Id. ¶ 34. (“Restitution conventions such as the Washington Principles
of 1998 are, independent of their applicability, legally non-binding and do not
lay the basis for individual claims for recovery”.) Id. ¶ 34. (Translations of
German sources are those of the author).
172. Id. ¶ 33.
173. Id. ¶ 33.
174. Id. ¶ 32.

2021]

Recovering Art Looted by the Nazis

573

was “clean.”175 The court acknowledged that such claims are not
limited to private-law property claims, or claims under the law of
obligations, but also include those pursuant to public law authority
(öffentlich-rechtliche Befugnisse).176 According to the court, the
confiscation by a government authority, however, only constitutes a
material defect within the meaning of §434 BGB if it results in the
“forfeiture or seizure” of the property.177 The court noted that Feigen
entered into a stipulation with the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) to turn over the painting, rather than DHS
forcibly taking it from him.178 The court offered no further
explanation as to why the threat of seizure by DHS was not
sufficient to constitute a legal defect under the German Civil Code,
even if an actual seizure was not carried out. However, the lower
court did. It explained that there was no legal equivalent in German
law, and Feigen had voluntarily exported the painting in the first
place.179 In essence, the court said tough luck and held:
No legal defect exists based on the purported confiscation in the
United States. Generally, while foreign rights may constitute a legal
defect, this requires that there be an equivalent [legal action] in the
German legal order. Otherwise claims for damages might arise
against a seller doing business in Germany that he or she could not
have predicted based on German law. Expanding this type of liability
would be unjust. A buyer who voluntarily exports his purchase is not
deserving of protection in this respect.180

In order to conclude its application of §434 BGB, the court
asked whether a replevin claim lodged by the Estate under New
York law would have been successful.181 As is customary in German
litigation, the High Regional Court commissioned an expert legal
opinion on the law of New York, where Feigen operated his
business.182 The expert opinion, adopted by the court, concluded
that a replevin claim pursued by the Estate in New York would have
been unsuccessful.183 If a replevin claim lodged by the Estate would
have been unsuccessful in New York, then no legal encumbrance
175. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17.
176. Id. ¶ 32.
177. Id. ¶ 18.
178. Id. ¶ 55.
179. Landesgericht [LG Köln] [Regional Court of Cologne], Apr. 24, 2013, 23
O 266/12
180. Id. ¶ 27. (Translation by the author).
181. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 ¶ 42. (“In particular, no replevin
claim exists . . .”).
182. In analyzing the elements of a successful replevin claim in New York,
the High Regional Court adopted the expert’s finding that a New York court
engaging in an interest analysis would hold that New York law applies to a
theoretical replevin claim from the Estate. Id.
183. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 ¶ 37. (“Under U.S. law, according
to the laches doctrine a replevin claim would have failed due to the insufficient
attempts to find and seek restitution [of the painting in question] on the part of
[Stern] and his heirs.”) Id.
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would have attached to the painting pursuant to §434 BGB.
Therefore the court held that Feigen acquired good title in 2000.
Based on its expert’s report, the High Regional Court set forth
several reasons why a replevin claim would indeed have failed in
New York. Citing U.S. v. Portrait of Wally184 the court pointed out
that property is no longer considered stolen in New York when it is
returned to its owner or his representative, though it is unclear,
according to the court’s expert, whether a forced sale would be
deemed a “theft” if payment of the purchase price flowed to the
seller.185 Having claimed that the Bissonnette court failed to
mention Dr. Stern’s compensation in 1964 by the Dusseldorf court,
the Cologne High Regional Court said its expert was also unable to
determine whether restitution in the form of damages is sufficient
to effectively cleanse an object’s characterization as stolen under
New York law.186 The High Regional Court’s American-law expert
opined that had the District of Rhode Island known that “the
purchase price” was paid, it might have been precluded from
characterizing the forced sale of the painting in question as a
“theft.”187 At the same time, the High Regional Court acknowledged
that receiving compensation for artwork forcibly auctioned would
not necessarily alter a piece’s characterization as stolen or
confiscated.188 The court explained that a forced auction would be
characterized as an unlawful taking in light of the pressure exerted
by the National Socialists.189 The effects of this pressure would
persist even if an original owner – a collector, for example, who
never intended to resell the piece – received a reasonable price for
his stolen artwork.190 In such a case, the court continued, a certain
sentimental value might attach to a piece, or a cultural or historical
interest may exist that requires a piece’s return, and these types of
facts could affect a piece’s characterization as stolen.191 The High
Regional Court ultimately viewed the painting as a piece that
belonged to the inventory of an art gallery and was intended for sale
anyway.192 This, coupled with Dr. Stern’s compensation by the
Regional Court of Dusseldorf in 1964, made it impossible to
continue to characterize the piece purchased by Feigen as stolen.193
In upholding the lower court’s dismissal of Feigen’s suit
184. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 261 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
185. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 ¶ 46.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 47.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. ¶ 47. The High Regional Court explains that this would apply, in
particular, to works of art that had belonged to private households, museums
or other collections. Id.
192. Id. ¶ 48.
193. Id. ¶ 48.
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against Lempertz, the High Regional Court found that nothing
surrounding the circumstances of the 2000 Lempertz auction
precluded Feigen from having acquired lawful title to the painting
under German law.194 The court additionally noted that even if the
painting were to be considered “lost or disappeared” (abhanden
gekommen) under German law, Feigen acquired title in good faith
because the piece had been sold at a public auction.195
2. Disagreement with the Bissonnette Court Regarding the
Underlying Facts
The District of Rhode Island began its opinion by stating that
“the majority of the salient facts are undisputed.”196 It turns out,
however, that the salient facts are anything but undisputed.
Instead, a German court, the High Regional Court of Cologne,
applied its understanding of the law of New York and relied on its
own and quite different understanding of the facts, disregarding the
facts as determined by the District of Rhode Island in Bissonnette.
The court flatly disagreed with the way the Bissonnette court
characterized some of the facts surrounding the 1937 auction of Dr.
Stern’s inventory. It found that no valid claim under American law
would have required Feigen to return the painting to the Estate,
thus failing to satisfy the legal defect provisions of the German Civil
Code and thereby making Feign a good faith purchaser.
a. The Proceeds from the Lempertz Auction of Dr. Stern’s
Gallery Inventory
The High Regional Court in Cologne disputed the Bissonnette
court’s finding that Dr. Stern fled Germany prior to collecting the
proceeds from the 1937 auction at Lempertz.197 The Estate, in its
complaint before the District of Rhode Island, had claimed that Dr.
Stern received none of the proceeds from the sales of the various
works of art in his inventory or otherwise when he fled Germany.198
It did so, incidentally, under an obligation to the court in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to make only those factual
assertions for which there exists or is likely to exist evidentiary
support.199 The High Regional Court nevertheless dismissed this
194. Id. ¶ 33. “Nothing indicates that the plaintiff did not obtain title under
German law.”
195. Id. ¶ 33.
196. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp 2d. at 302.
197. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3 ¶ 45. See Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp
2d. at 303. The Bissonnette court claims that once Dr. Stern left Germany, the
German government issued an order freezing his assets. It supports that claim
on the basis of a commentator from Concordia writing about the case in a piece
entitled “Auktion 392 Reclaiming the Galerie Stern, Dusseldorf.” Id.
198. Complaint at 6, Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300 (D.R.I. 2007).
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)(3) (2007).
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finding by the Bissonnette court, pointing to an earlier decision of
the Regional Court of Dusseldorf that had awarded Dr. Stern
additional compensatory damages as part of a restitution
proceeding in 1964.200 The 1964 decision awarded Dr. Stern the
difference between the sale price attained in 1937 and the actual
market value of the pieces in 1937.201 For the High Regional Court,
this was persuasive enough to find that Dr. Stern did in fact collect
the proceeds of the forced auction in 1937. The notion that Dr. Stern
collected the proceeds is evidenced, according to the High Regional
Court, by Dr. Stern’s pleadings during the 1964 restitution
proceedings in Dusseldorf. In those proceedings, according to the
High Regional Court of Cologne, Dr. Stern’s claim for damages was
offset by auction proceeds he is said to have received.202 The High
Regional Court referred to Dr. Stern’s own complaint in that case,
according to which a remainder of 4,230 Reichsmark was paid out
to Dr. Stern after commissions were paid to Lempertz once the
painting at issue sold.203 Thus, in the compensation proceedings in
Dusseldorf, Dr. Stern only claimed the rest of what he should have
received had he received the full market value in 1937 for the piece.
The compensation decision of the Regional Court of Dusseldorf
confirms, as well, that Dr. Stern had also claimed in 1964 that as a
result of the forced auction of his gallery, his income was so high
that he was forced to pay an additional 61,577 Reichsmark and
sought compensation for these expenses accordingly.204
The High Regional Court in Cologne finally noted in its ruling
that Feigen, in his suit against Lempertz, did not proffer additional
evidence to dispute Dr. Stern’s pleadings in the 1964 proceeding.205
As a result, the fact that Dr. Stern received compensation in 1964
removed the taint on the works stolen from him, according to the
court, thereby transforming the works of art from pieces considered
stolen by the Nazis, to pieces in which Stern no longer had a
proprietary interest.206 The court explained its rationale:
[A]ccording to the court, in certain cases a piece may no longer be
characterized as unlawfully taken if restitution has been made in
such a manner that the rightful owner of a piece which, prior to the
auction itself was held out for sale, receives the proceeds of the sale
and any material damages resulting from the reduced proceeds [as a
200. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3, ¶44. See also Klaus Schurig,
Nazi Beflecktes Eigentum und die USA in: Festschrift für Werner Beulke zum
70. Geburtstag, 1334. C.F. Müller. 2015 at 1333. (“The [Dusseldorf
compensation] judgment was even cited by the American court. It must have
seen the decision (but perhaps not in translation?).” Id.
201. Oberlandesgericht, supra note 3, ¶ 45.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Landesgericht Dusseldorf [LG Düsseldorf] [Regional Court of
Dusseldorf], judgment dated 24 February 1964 - 26 O 454/62, at p. 3.
205. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3, ¶ 45.
206. Id. ¶ 48.
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result of a forced auction].207

The court found it important that: (1) restitution was made; (2)
the painting had been held out for sale as part of the inventory of
Dr. Stern’s gallery anyway; and (3) Dr. Stern received damages in
1964 as a result of the forced sale, which was tantamount to making
him whole.
The High Regional Court further dismissed arguments that the
compensation awarded to Dr. Stern in the 1964 proceeding failed to
make him whole on account of factors such as inflation, or the
development of the art market over the past eighty years. According
to the court, the market value of the piece in 1937 controlled – that
is, when the conduct causing the injury occurred, plus damages for
loss of use up until 1964.208 The court concluded its line of reasoning
as follows:
The plaintiff legally acquired the painting at the auction in 2000. In
any case, at that point in time, acquisition of the piece by the bidder
in 1937 no longer was unlawful on account of the fact that the
proceeds of the sale from the auction were paid out by the defendant’s
[Lempertz] legal predecessor, as well as on account of compensatory
damages being paid in the 1960’s.209

The High Regional Court thus concluded that nothing
precluded Feigen from becoming a good faith purchaser of the
Ludovici painting. In addition to the other reasons laid out by the
court, Dr. Stern had been adequately compensated for his loss.
b. The Court Finds Dr. Stern’s Efforts to Recover the
Painting Insufficient
The High Regional Court in Cologne disagreed with the
Bissonnette court regarding the efforts Dr. Stern made to recover
the painting Feigen bought from Lempertz. It concluded, based on
the expert legal opinion on the law of New York it requested that
the Common Law doctrine of laches in New York would also have
precluded a successful claim for replevin in the United States.210
The High Regional Court adopted Lempertz’ argument that in
contrast to his private collection, which was confiscated and sold by
the Gestapo after he fled Germany, Dr. Stern did not make efforts
to find the paintings at issue in the 1937 auction.211 The High
Regional Court did not accept Feigen’s attempt to counter the
argument by referencing the Bissonnette decision.212 According to
the High Regional Court, the Bissonnette decision did not

207. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3, ¶ 44.
208. Id. ¶ 49.
209. Id. ¶ 50.
210. Id. ¶ 51.
211. Id. ¶ 52.
212. Id.
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distinguish between general efforts made by Dr. Stern to find works
stolen or confiscated from him by the Gestapo and his works that
were subject to a forced sale at auction. What’s more, according to
the High Regional Court, the general reference by Feigen in his
complaint to the findings of the Bissonnette court that Dr. Stern had
indeed looked for his artwork and even traveled to Europe, where
he took out advertisements in art magazines publicizing his losses,
was not sufficient to overcome the argument put forward by
Lempertz that Feigen failed to identify concrete efforts made to find
pieces from this particular 1937 auction.213 In the words of the High
Regional Court, “the mere blanket assertion that [Dr. Stern]
searched for his works of art after the war is insufficient.”214
To further support this line of reasoning, the High Regional
Court again referred to the 1964 restitution proceedings in
Dusseldorf, in which Dr. Stern only sought damages for the
difference between the 1937 sale price of his inventory and its
market value at that time.215 According to the court, Dr. Stern’s
efforts were not aimed at recovering pieces that were taken from
him, but in recovering the monetary value of his losses.216 Dr. Stern,
according to the court, claimed offset damages, was awarded them,
and did not further appeal the decision of the Dusseldorf court.217
Finally, while the High Regional Court acknowledged that Dr.
Stern’s heirs registered the painting at dispute as stolen in the Art
Loss Register, this was not done until 2004, nearly 70 years after
the theft. The court, therefore, found that the lack of diligence on
Dr. Stern’s part would seriously prejudice any defendant.218
c.

No Liability Culpa in Contrahendo (For Fraudulent or
Negligent Representation)

The High Regional Court concluded its judgment by dealing
with a claim that Feigen failed to assert: the issue of damages based
on liability of the other party during the process of entering into the
contract, known in Germany by the Roman law institute of culpa in
contrahendo. A claim such as this can be brought in addition to the
§ 434 BGB claim.219 Feigen, though, sought only the full purchase
price for the painting as a result of his relinquishment of it to United
States authorities; he did not pursue a claim for damages arising
from Lempertz’ conduct prior to entering into the purchase
agreement for the painting. To further impede a possible claim
relating to Lempertz’ misrepresentation, the High Regional Court
213. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3, ¶ 52.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. ¶ 54.
219. Id. ¶ 57.
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noted that the applicable statute of limitations of ten years began
to run in 2000, when a claim arising out of any potential breach of
duty arose, not in 2009 when Feigen turned over the painting.220

B. On The Use of Expert Legal Opinions on Foreign
Law in German Court Proceedings
The German Code of Civil Procedure authorizes German courts
to ascertain foreign law when necessary.221 This is often done by
resorting to an independent legal expert commissioned to write an
expert opinion about the foreign law in question based on legal
questions posed to the expert by the court. Pursuant to the rules of
the German Code of Civil Procedure, the court in this case
commissioned an analysis of American law in order to properly
apply the material defect provision of §434 BGB. The court needed
to know whether the Estate would have been able to lodge a
successful replevin claim against Feigen, thus constituting a thirdparty claim. The expert who was commissioned was a university
professor who presumably was an expert in the law of the State of
New York. The High Regional Court adopted the expert’s findings
as set forth in its written opinion.222 In adopting the findings
contained in the expert opinion, the court came to its own conclusion
that under New York law there would not have been a valid claim
by the Estate against Feigen.223
This author has had occasion to draft complex expert legal
opinions on United States law for German courts. Expert legal
opinions (Rechtsgutachten) are certainly helpful to the court, but
they can also be problematic. They can be problematic because quite
often the independent experts commissioned by German courts are
indeed German lawyers whose understanding of the Common Law
is one as a system of law foreign to them.224 Even in cases, such as
those the author has participated in, where the expert is an
American, the German parties in the case submit their own legal
responses and often reveal their Civil Law analysis and legal
reasoning.
A German court, steeped by its very nature in the methods of
Civil Law reasoning and law finding, may encounter difficulties
analyzing the foreign law of another legal system, particularly the
Common Law. Quite frequently, the question the court poses to the
expert is framed in abstract terms and is done so, of course, in
German. This requires a linguistic translation of the question when
220. Id. ¶ 58.
221. See § 293 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure).
222. Oberlandesgericht Köln, supra note 3, ¶ 29.
223. Id. ¶ 22.
224. Thomas Pfeiffer, Methoden der Ermittlung ausländischen Rechts, in:
Stuerner, Ralf et al (ed.): Festschrift für Dieter Leipold zum. 70. Geburtstag.
Tübingen, 2009, 284. [trans.: “Methods of Ascertaining Foreign Law”].
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the expert is an American not completely fluent in German.
Furthermore, it oftentimes requires clarification as to what the
court is looking for because the German court frames the question
while thinking in terms of Civil Law concepts and legal institutes.
The parties to the litigation who respond to the expert’s opinion
often do so in a manner suited more to Civil Law legal methods than
those of the Common Law. Citations to hornbooks or Restatements
are common in responses. These sources are often expressly
prohibited in the United States by various United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal across the country that want to see legal sources
cited, such as statutes, regulations, or cases. German lawyers,
however, are likely to be drawn to United States treatises and
restatements of the law that are largely the work of organized
committees of law professors, judges, and expert practitioners. After
all, a substantial amount of respect and deference is given to
commentators of the law in Germany, most of whom are university
law professors or scholars at prestigious research organizations –
such as any of the legal institutes of the Max Plank Institute. This
is evident when reading German legal briefs, where citing a wellknown treatise on a particular area of the law to support an
asserted legal position is often done prior to citing applicable
German case law.
An important task of the court when analyzing foreign law
involves distinguishing between questions of law and questions of
fact. A question posed by a German court to a foreign-law expert
might involve a question of law under German law, but a question
of fact under the foreign law to be ascertained. Further, as is the
case in litigation in the United States, the use of expert opinions
commissioned either by a court or introduced by one of the parties
in Germany inevitably can lead to a “battle of the experts.” In these
cases, it falls on the court to decide between conflicting opinions on
what the foreign law actually prescribes. It had to do so in this case,
in order to decide whether the Estate would have been able to
successfully assert a replevin came against Feigen in New York.
Based in large part on the opinion of one expert, it concluded in the
negative.

C. Criticism from Commentators in Germany
The way commentators in Germany discuss these two cases
may astonish many Americans. The criticism in Germany not only
takes issue with the Bissonnette court’s understanding and
recitation of critical facts surrounding Dr. Stern’s loss of the pieces
in his gallery. Those criticizing the decision put forward
justifications that appear to minimize the confiscatory nature of the
Gestapo’s orders to Dr. Stern – not to mention what will appear to
many to be a stunning failure from a historical and social
perspective to acknowledge the real danger and oppression felt by
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those who were the targets of widespread National Socialist
propaganda and persecution. The discussions tend to be heavy in
dry technical legal analysis with reasoning that makes the
circumstances surrounding what happened to Dr. Stern in the late
1930s appear more like every-day legal transactions than prolonged
persecution and theft.
While incredulity regarding German reaction and commentary
may be understandable and justified in some cases, German
commentators do ask questions that we in the States ought to think
about. Many commentators, as well as the High Regional Court,
believe that Dr. Stern was adequately compensated for the loss of
his gallery inventory, particularly in the Feigen case, where – as
explained above – Dr. Stern purportedly received offset damages
from a Dusseldorf court in 1964 for the works he owned and
displayed for sale at his gallery. Assuming that this is correct, there
is disagreement in the public record – after all, does traditional
Common Law analysis address what happens when an original
owner is compensated monetarily for his lost or stolen property but
the property thereafter resurfaces? An investigation into that
doctrinal question of American Common Law here would exceed the
scope of this Article. But the High Regional Court had noted that its
expert on New York law opined that a stolen item is no longer stolen
in New York when it is returned to its true owner. The expert could
not offer any answer, however, as to what New York law says about
compensation equivalent to some ascertained market value that is
paid to the original owner.
Professor Klaus Schurig, in an article entitled, “Nazi Tainted
Artwork and the U.S.,” acknowledges at the outset what he believes
to be an undisputed fact: that no one can rely on his or her good
faith when the state had confiscated innumerable quantities of art
during a period of Jewish persecution.225 Schurig criticizes the
Bissonnette court’s version, however, of what happened to Dr. Stern
from 1937 onward. He accuses the court of bending the facts to
obtain a particular result, writing that the Bissonnette court simply
painted Lempertz as a willing participant in doing the bidding of
the National Socialists.226 Again, for Schurig, when the state takes
art as part of its persecution of Jews and such confiscated art is sold
at auction, no one can rely on their good faith. But Schurig says this
is not the case when the affected dealer (Dr. Stern), albeit under the
pressure of the Nazis, was in-fact allowed to choose any auction
house he wanted, and in the case of Lempertz, chose one with which
he had maintained a friendly relationship.227 What’s more,
according to Schurig, Dr. Stern was able to set minimum prices for
each piece, and ultimately got those minimum prices for each piece
225. Klaus Schurig, Nazi Beflecktes Eigentum und die USA in: Festschrift
für Werner Beulke zum 70. Geburtstag, 1334. C.F. Müller. 2015.
226. Id. at 1332, 1333.
227. Id. at 1333.
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– even getting pieces back that were not auctioned off. To further
minimize the severity of the actions taken by the Gestapo against
Dr. Stern, Schurig notes that the proprietor of Lempertz himself
was jailed in 1942 for being “too friendly to Jews.”228 Schurig
acknowledges that Jews were persecuted in the most pernicious
manner, but that only after years of historical perspective did the
acute threat to life and limb for the Jewish population become
clear.229
For these reasons, among others, Schurig argues that it is
extreme to characterize all dispositions of property belonging to
Jews – even those that were forced – as unconscionable in the legal
sense (sittenwidrig), which would render them void.230 If this were
the case, he goes on to explain, then it would have to apply to all
those persecuted, including those who fled the Nazi regime for
political reasons.231 Therefore, according to Schurig, in order to view
the transactions related to the forced sale of Dr. Stern’s art
inventory as invalid, a legal rule must exist in order to do so, and in
Schurig’s analysis of German law nothing in the law makes those
transactions per se invalid.232 Having concluded that the forced sale
of Dr. Stern’s gallery can no longer be equated with theft, Schurig’s
view is that the auction that took place in 2000, where Feigen
bought the Carracci painting, was merely a typical resale by the
owner.233
Milena Reinfandt, general counsel for Lempertz, repeats this
view and its reasoning. She acknowledges the disagreement as to
whether works of art that were sold as a result of Nazi persecution
and pressure should be characterized as stolen. This remains the
case when the original owner received a reasonable price for the
work even though he had not intended to sell it. Reinfandt argues,
however, that the Carracci painting purchased by Feigen in 2000
had belonged to Dr. Stern’s gallery inventory and that the minimum
price Dr. Stern received was supplemented by the Dusseldorf
compensation court in 1964.234 For Reinfandt, what the High
Regional Court of Cologne effectively did in the Feigen case was
prevent an award of double damages to Dr. Stern.235
Criticism in Germany also takes aim at Dr. Stern’s efforts to
recover the painting that Feigen eventually purchased. Because,
critics allege, Dr. Stern only undertook efforts to recover the works
that did not sell at auction and were eventually confiscated by the
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1336.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1334.
233. Id. at 1339.
234. Milena Reinfandt, Kein doppelter Schadensersatz für ein 1937 bei
Lempertz versteigertes und 1964 restituiertes Bild eines jüdischen
Kunsthändlers, 19 Kunst und Recht 40, 42 (2017).
235. Id.
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Gestapo, Dr. Stern’s delay in searching for the Carracci painting
could not be excused.236 Reinfandt goes a step further to allege that
the Estate actually acted in contradiction to what Dr. Stern wanted
– namely, that after Dr. Stern received compensation from the
Regional District Court of Dusseldorf in 1964, he no longer pursued
the matter any further.237

V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
German criticism raises questions that should be addressed by
American commentators and courts. One of the most important is
how claims for works of art should be dealt with when compensation
had been paid to the victims of Nazi persecution by special courts in
Germany. The attorney for Lempertz praised the High Regional
Court’s 2016 decision against Feigen by saying that what the court
did there was to prevent the award of double damages to the Estate
since restitution had already been paid to Dr. Stern in 1964 for the
works in his gallery that were auctioned by Lempertz.238 But does
such compensation preclude the claims of those forced to sell their
property by the Nazis? It is possible, as pointed out by the
Bissonnette court itself, that the Defendant, Ms. Bissonnette, could
have pleaded “claim preclusion” in the District of Rhode Island?239
And at a broader level, how do the courts in both the United States
and Germany go about ascertaining critical facts related to events
that took place over seventy years ago? As noted earlier, two courts
were applying law from the United States but doing so on the basis
of different facts.
With respect to the underlying factual dispute, however, it is
likely that Dr. Stern never saw much of any of the proceeds from
the forced sale of his inventory. Dr. Stern alleged in the proceeding
in Dusseldorf in 1964 that he was forced to pay increased taxes prior
to fleeing Germany on account of the sale of his property; the Estate
repeated the claim in its complaint in Rhode Island. It is widely
known that a confiscatory Reichsfluchtssteuer (imperial flight tax)
was imposed on Jews who fled Germany. This has been reported in
mainstream German media sources.240 A former New York
236. Id. at 42, 43.
237. Id. at 43.
238. Id. at 40.
239. Bissonnette¸ 548 F.3d at 53.
240. See e.g. Sven Felix Kellerhoff, Ein demokratisches Gesetz plünderte die
Juden aus, WELT (June 5, 2013), www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/
article116836031/Ein-demokratisches-Gesetz-pluenderte-die-Juden-aus.html;
Abbas gibt Juden Schuld am Holocaust, SPIEGEL (May 1, 2018, 6:01 PM),
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/mahmoud-abbas-gibt-juden-schuld-amholocaust-a-1205676.html (last accessed October 30, 2018) (stating that “[f]or
the majority of roughly 300,000 Jews, in total, who were able to emigrate out of
Germany, their exodus was generally associated with significant losses in
wealth because the Nazi regime confiscated their property.“).
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practitioner in the area of art law and expert in the field, Professor
Jennifer Kreder, argued in an amicus curiae brief to the Second
Circuit that works of art sold by Jews in Germany in the 1930s
should be defined as “Flight Art.”241
German commentators may technically be correct when they
assert that Dr. Stern received the proceeds of the sale – that is,
those proceeds may have been technically deposited to his bank
account. The text of the 1964 Dusseldorf decision, not only reveals
that Dr. Stern in fact brought a claim for discriminatory taxes levied
on him prior to his flight from Germany, but that his efforts in the
late 50s and early 60s to recover his property or be compensated for
his losses met resistance every step of the way, including from
Lempertz.242 In the 1964 compensation decision, the court
recounted Lempertz’s argument at that time, as stated in a letter
from its director, that all of Dr. Stern’s pieces were auctioned at
regular prices and that damages on account of the expedited and
forced sale of the property were out of the question.243 Furthermore,
Lempertz argued that Dr. Stern dictated his own prices and
obtained them.244
The compensation court in Dusseldorf ultimately ruled in favor
of Dr. Stern. It noted that in art circles it was widely known that
Dr. Stern was being forced to liquidate his gallery and that
knowledge surely affected the prices Dr. Stern was able to obtain
for both the forced auction of his works, as well as the hastily
arranged sales of pieces in his gallery.245 But this small victory for
Dr. Stern required years of struggle and resistance.
It is reasonable to conclude the Bissonnette lies on a solid
substantive foundation, viewed apart from defense counsel’s clear
errors and omissions. Unlike commentators in Germany, or the
High Regional Court of Cologne, the District of Rhode Island did not
view what happened to Dr. Stern as a typical and voluntary
commercial transaction. It saw the Nazi’s treatment of Dr. Stern
and the orders imposed on him as tantamount to theft, regardless
of whether he was in the art business or not. Even if commentators
in Germany believe that because the painting had been auctioned
and transferred under German property law rules in Germany, a
review of Rhode Island law, as well as other United States choiceof-law decisions, shows that the selection of Rhode Island law to
adjudicate the replevin claim was proper and in line with choice-oflaw determinations in similar United States cases. The Bissonnette
court further disagreed regarding how diligent Dr. Stern was in
trying to recover the painting at issue in the case. It viewed his
241. Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,
928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019) (No 18-0634-cv), 2018 WL 3013320.
242. Landesgericht Dusseldorf, supra note 200, passim.
243. Landesgericht Dusseldorf, supra note 200, at 4.
244. Id. at 4.
245. Id. at 7-8.
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efforts in light of the totality of the circumstances affecting him
prior, during and after the war; it did not impose onerous
requirements on his search or trivialize the nature of his
persecution, which it may seem to many that German criticism has
done. And had the District of Rhode Island addressed the statute of
limitations issue, it could justifiably have held that the statute did
not begin to run until the Estate discovered the whereabouts of the
painting.
As long as Americans and Germans disagree over the details
and significance of the facts surrounding the forced dispossession of
Jewish property in the 1930s and 40s, in an atmosphere where Jews
were treated as second-class citizens and millions sent to their
death, the international purchase and sale of artwork will continue
to be fraught with these problems. The goal of this Article, hopefully
achieved, was to help the reader understand the German approach
to a case involving looted art and to compare that approach with
that of a court in the United States in a specific case.
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